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We construct a practically implementable classical processing for the BB84 protocol and the six-
state protocol that fully utilizes the accurate channel estimation method, which is also known as
the quantum tomography. Our proposed processing yields at least as high key rate as the standard
processing by Shor and Preskill. We show two examples of quantum channels over which the key rate
of our proposed processing is strictly higher than the standard processing. In the second example,
the BB84 protocol with our proposed processing yields a positive key rate even though the so-called
error rate is higher than the 25% limit.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 89.70.-a, 03.65.Wj
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has attracted great
attention as an unconditionally secure key distribution
scheme. The fundamental feature of QKD protocols is
that the amount of information gained by an eavesdrop-
per, usually referred to as Eve, can be estimated from the
channel between the legitimate sender and the receiver,
usually referred to as Alice and Bob respectively. Such
a task cannot be conducted in classical key distribution
schemes. If the estimated amount is lower than a thresh-
old, then Alice and Bob determine the length of a secret
key from the estimated amount of Eve’s information, and
can share a secret key by performing the information rec-
onciliation (error correction) [1, 2] and the privacy ampli-
fication [2, 3]. Since the key rate, which is the length of
securely sharable key per channel use, is one of the most
important criteria for the efficiency of QKD protocols,
the estimation of the channel is of primary importance.
In this paper, we only treat the BB84 protocol [4] and
the six-state protocol [5], and we mean the BB84 pro-
tocol and the six-state protocol by the QKD protocols
throughout the paper. Furthermore, a classical process-
ing consists of a procedure to determine a key rate from
a channel estimate and a procedure for the information
reconciliation and the privacy amplification.
Mathematically, quantum channels are described by
trace preserving completely positive (TPCP) maps [6].
Conventionally in the QKD protocols, we only use the
statistics of matched measurement outcomes, which are
transmitted and received by the same basis, to estimate
the TPCP map describing the quantum channel; mis-
matched measurement outcomes, which are transmitted
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and received by different bases, are discarded in the con-
ventionally used channel estimation methods. By using
the statistics of mismatched measurement outcomes in
addition to that of matched measurement outcomes, we
can estimate the TPCP map more accurately than the
conventional estimation method. Such an accurate chan-
nel estimation method is also known as the quantum to-
mography [7, 8]. In early 90s, Barnett et al. [9] showed
that the use of mismatched measurement outcomes en-
ables Alice and Bob to detect the presence of Eve with
higher probability for the so-called intercept and resend
attack. Furthermore, some literatures use the accurate
estimation method to ensure the channel to be a Pauli
channel [10, 11, 12, 13], where a Pauli channel is a chan-
nel over which four kinds of Pauli errors (including the
identity) occur probabilistically. However the channel is
not necessarily a Pauli channel.
The use of the accurate channel estimation method
in a classical processing has a potential to improve the
key rates of previously known classical processing. How-
ever, there is no proposed practically implementable clas-
sical processing that fully utilizes the accurate estimation
method. Recently, Renner et al. [14, 15, 16] developed in-
formation theoretical techniques to prove the security of
the QKD protocols. Their proof techniques can be used
to prove the security of the QKD protocols with a classi-
cal processing that fully utilizes the accurate estimation
method. However they only considered Pauli channels or
partial twirled channels1. For Pauli channels, the accu-
rate estimation method and the conventional estimation
method make no difference.
In this paper, we construct a practically implementable
classical processing that fully utilizes the accurate chan-
nel estimation method. More precisely, we present a pro-
cedure to determine a key rate based on the accurate
1 By the partial twirling (discrete twirling) [17], any channel be-
comes a Pauli channel.
2channel estimate for the BB84 protocol and the six-state
protocol respectively. Then we also present a practically
implementable procedure for the information reconcilia-
tion and the privacy amplification in which we can share
a secret key at the determined key rate. Note that we
only change the classical processing of the QKD proto-
cols, and the method of the transmission and reception
of quantum systems in the QKD protocols remain un-
changed.
Although it is straight forward to determine a key rate
from the accurate channel estimate for the six-state pro-
tocol, it is subtle how to determine a key rate from the
accurate channel estimate for the BB84 protocol. More
specifically, we can obtain only partial parameters de-
scribing the channel, and there remain some free param-
eters. Thus we have to consider the worst case, i.e., the
key rate that is minimized over the free parameters. We
shall show an explicit procedure to determine the mini-
mized key rate.
Our proposed processing yields at least as high key rate
as the standard processing by Shor and Preskill [18]. As
examples, we show that the key rate of our proposed clas-
sical processing is strictly higher than that of the stan-
dard processing for the amplitude damping channel and
the rotation channel, which are unitary channel that ro-
tate the Bloch sphere in the z-x plane. In the example
of the amplitude damping channel, we show that the key
rate of the so-called reverse reconciliation2, in which the
key is generated based on Bob’s bit sequence, is higher
than the key rate of the direct reconciliation, in which the
key is generated based on Alice’s bit sequence3. In the
example of the rotation channel, we solve a problem left
open in [22, Section 5]—the problem whether it is possi-
ble to obtain positive key rates from both matched mea-
surement outcomes and mismatched measurement out-
comes for the BB84 protocol.
It is believed that we cannot share any secret key if
the so-called error rate is higher than the 25% limit in
the BB84 protocol [23]. However Curty et al. [24] sug-
gested that, for some asymmetric error patterns, it might
be possible to share a secret key even for the error rates
above the 25% limit. In the example of the rotation chan-
nel, we show that we can actually obtain a positive key
rate even though the error rate is higher than the 25%
limit.
Devetak and Winter [25] also showed the key rate for-
mula that coincide with the key rate formula shown by
Renner et al. [14, 15, 16] if we know the channel exactly.
By combining our proposed procedure to determine a key
rate based on the accurate channel estimate and Deve-
tak and Winter’s procedure for the information reconcil-
2 The reverse reconciliation was originally proposed by Maurer [19]
in the classical key agreement.
3 For QKD protocols with weak coherent states, literatures [20, 21]
already pointed out that the key rate of the direct reconciliation
and the reverse reconciliation are different.
iation and the privacy amplification, we can obtain the
same key rate as in this paper. However the procedure
for the information reconciliation and the privacy ampli-
fication shown by Devetak and Winter is not practically
implementable.
Our proposed information reconciliation can be imple-
mented by any efficiently decodeable linear code for the
Slepian-Wolf coding [26]. For example, we can use the
low density parity check matrix (LDPC) code [27].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We
first present a procedure for the information reconcili-
ation and the privacy amplification in Section II. Then
we present a procedure to determine a key rate from the
estimate of the channel in Section III. We consider the
amplitude damping channel, the unital channel, and the
rotation channel as examples, and show that the key rate
of our proposed processing is higher than the standard
processing in Section IV. We state the conclusion in Sec-
tion V.
In this paper, we mainly consider standard procedures
for the information reconciliation and the privacy ampli-
fication with one-way classical communication, i.e., we do
not treat, except in Remarks 9 and 10, the noisy prepro-
cessing [14, 16] nor a procedure with two-way classical
communication [23, 28]. However, our results in this pa-
per can be easily extended to procedures with the noisy
preprocessing and two-way classical communication (see
Remark 11).
II. INFORMATION RECONCILIATION AND
PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
We construct practical procedure for the information
reconciliation and the privacy amplification in this sec-
tion. We first describe our proposed procedure with gen-
eral linear codes and the maximum a posteriori probabil-
ity (MAP) decoding. Then as an example of efficiently
decodeable linear code, we show how to apply the sum-
product algorithm of the low density parity check matrix
(LDPC) code4 to our proposed procedure in Remark 5.
For the simplicity we assume that Eve’s attack is the
collective attack5, i.e., the channel connecting Alice and
Bob is given by tensor products of a channel EB from a
qubit density matrix to itself. As is usual in QKD litera-
tures, we assume that Eve can access all the environment
of channel EB; the channel to the environment is denoted
by EE .
4 It should be noted that the application of the LDPC codes for
classical key agreement protocols has been considered by Mura-
matsu [29], in which he uses the LDPC code as the Slepian-Wolf
source coding.
5 This assumption is not essential. By using the de Finetti repre-
sentation arguments [15, 30], our result can be extended to the
coherent attack.
3In the six-state protocol, Alice randomly sends bit 0 or
1 to Bob by modulating it into a transmission basis that is
randomly chosen from the z-basis {|0z〉, |1z〉}, the x-basis
{|0x〉, |1x〉}, or the y-basis {|0y〉, |1y〉}, where |0a〉, |1a〉 are
eigenstates of the Pauli matrix σa for a ∈ {x, y, z} respec-
tively. Then Bob randomly chooses one of measurement
observables σx, σy, and σz, and converts a measurement
result +1 or −1 into a bit 0 or 1 respectively. After a
sufficient number of transmissions, Alice and Bob pub-
licly announce their transmission bases and measurement
observables. They also announce a part of their bit se-
quences for estimating channel EB. Note that Alice and
Bob do not discard mismatched measurement outcomes,
which are transmitted and received by different bases, to
estimate the channel accurately.
In the BB84 protocol, Alice only uses z-basis and x-
basis to transmit the bit sequence, and Bob only uses
observable σz and σx to receive the bit sequence.
Henceforth, we only treat Alice’s bit sequence x ∈ Fn2
that is transmitted in z-basis and corresponding Bob’s
bit sequence y ∈ Fn2 that is received in σz-measurement,
where F2 is the finite field of order 2. Furthermore, we
occasionally omit the subscripts {x, y, z} of bases, and
the basis {|0〉, |1〉} is regarded as z-basis unless otherwise
stated. Since the pair of sequences (x,y) is transmitted
and received in z-basis, they are independently identically
distributed according to
PXY (x, y) :=
1
2
〈yz|EB(|xz〉〈xz|)|yz〉. (1)
Note that the distribution PXY can be estimated from
the statistics of the sample bits that are transmitted by
z-basis and received by σz-observable.
Before describing our proposed procedure, we should
review the basic facts of linear codes. An [n, n−m] clas-
sical linear code C is an (n−m)-dimensional linear sub-
space of Fn2 , and its parity check matrix M is an m× n
matrix of rank m with 0, 1 entries such that Mc = 0 for
any codeword c ∈ C. By using these preparations, our
proposed procedure is described as follows.
(i) Alice calculates syndrome t :=Mx, and sends it to
Bob over the public channel.
(ii) Bob decodes (y, t) into estimate xˆ of x by using the
maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) decod-
ing. More precisely, Bob selects xˆ ∈ Fn2 such that
M xˆ = t and a posteriori probability Pn
X|Y (xˆ|y) is
maximized (if there exist tied sequences, then he
selects the smallest one with respect to the lexi-
cographic order), where Pn
X|Y is the nth product
distribution of PX|Y .
(iii) Alice randomly choose a hash function f : Fn2 →
Sn from a set of universal hash functions [31], and
sends the choice to Bob over the public channel.
Then Alice and Bob’s final keys are sA := f(x)
and sB := f(xˆ) respectively.
If we set the rate of syndrome as
m
n
> H(X |Y ), (2)
then there exists a linear code in the LDPC codes such
that Bob’s decoding error probability is arbitrary small
for sufficiently large n [32, Theorem 2], where H(X |Y )
is the conditional entropy with respect to the joint prob-
ability distribution PXY [33]. Note that the base of a
logarithm and a (conditional) entropy are 2 throughout
the paper.
The key rate, 1
n
log |Sn|, is determined according to the
results of privacy amplification [15, Corollary 3.3.7 and
Lemma 6.4.1]. Let
Hρ(X |E) := H(ρXE)−H(ρE)
be the conditional von Neumann entropy with respect to
density matrix ρXE :=
∑
x∈F2
1
2 |x〉〈x|⊗EE(|x〉〈x|), where
H(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy for a density matrix
ρ. If the key rate satisfies
1
n
log |Sn| < Hρ(X |E)− m
n
, (3)
then the final key SA is secure in the sense of the trace
distance6. More precisely, the density matrix, ρSATFEn ,
which describes Alice’s final key SA, the publicly trans-
mitted syndrome T and hash function F , and the state
in Eve’s system En, satisfies
‖ρSATFEn − ρS ⊗ ρTFEn‖ ≤ ε
for arbitrary small ε and sufficiently large n, where ρS :=∑
s∈Sn
1
|Sn| |s〉〈s| is the density matrix that describes the
uniformly distributed key on Sn. From Eqs. (2) and (3),
we find that
Hρ(X |E)−H(X |Y ) (4)
is a secure key rate.
Note that the conditional von Neumann entropy
Hρ(X |E) can be calculated from the channel EB as
follows. Since system X is classical, we can rewrite
H(ρXE) = H(X) +
∑
x∈F2
1
2H(EE(|x〉〈x|)). Noting
that H(EE(|x〉〈x|)) = H(EB(|x〉〈x|)) and H(ρE) =
H((id ⊗ EB)(ψ)) for the maximally entangled state
|ψ〉 := ∑x∈F2 1√2 |x〉|x〉, Eve’s ambiguity for Alice’s bit,
Hρ(X |E), can be calculated from the channel EB. How
to determine Eve’s ambiguity Hρ(X |E) from a estimate
of the channel EB is discussed in the next section.
Remark 1 If we use the conventionally used method [18,
34] for decoding xˆ, the rate of syndrome m
n
cannot be as
6 The trace norm of a matrix A is defined by ‖A‖ := Tr√A∗A.
Then the trace distance between two matrices A and B is defined
by ‖A− B‖.
4small as the right hand side of Eq. (2). Thus, the key
rate in Eq. (4) cannot be achieved. Define a probability
distribution on F2 as
PW (w) :=
∑
y∈F2
PY (y)PX|Y (y + w|y). (5)
Then the error w := x + y between Alice and Bob’s
sequence is distributed according to PnW . In the con-
ventional method, Bob calculates the difference of syn-
dromes, t + My, and selects the error wˆ such that
Mwˆ = t+My and the likelihood of the error PnW (wˆ) is
maximized. Then , the estimate for Alice’s sequence is
xˆ = y+ wˆ. The rate of syndrome have to be larger than
H(W ) for the decoding error probability to be small. By
the log-sum inequality [33] and Eq. (5), we have
H(X |Y )
=
∑
x,y∈F2
PY (y)PX|Y (x|y) log 1
PX|Y (x|y)
=
∑
w,y∈F2
PY (y)PX|Y (y + w|y) log PY (y)
PY (y)PX|Y (y + w|y)
≤
∑
w∈F2
PW (w) log
1
PW (w)
= H(W ).
Thus, the key rate in Eq. (4) cannot be achieved by the
conventional decoding method unless PX|Y (w|0) equals
PX|Y (1 + w|1) for any w ∈ F2.
Remark 2 By switching the role of Alice and Bob, we
obtain a classical processing that achieves the key rate
Hρ(Y |E)−H(Y |X). (6)
Such a procedure is usually called the reverse reconcilia-
tion. On the other hand the original procedure is usually
called the direct reconciliation. The reverse reconcilia-
tion was originally proposed by Maurer in the classical
key agreement context [19].
Note that we can calculate the conditional von Neu-
mann entropy Hρ(Y |E) = H(ρY E) − H(ρE) from the
channel EB as follows. Let ψABE be a purification of
(id ⊗ EB)(ψ), and let ρBE := TrA[ψABE ]. Then, the
density matrix ρY E is derived by measurement on Bob’s
system, i.e.,
ρY E =
∑
y∈F2
(|y〉〈y| ⊗ I)ρBE(|y〉〈y| ⊗ I).
In Section IVA, we shall show that the key rate of the
reverse reconciliation can be higher than that of the di-
rect reconciliation. The fact that the key rate of the
direct reconciliation and the reverse reconciliation are
different is already pointed out for QKD protocols with
weak coherent states [20, 21].
Remark 3 We used the MAP decoding instead of the
maximum likelihood (ML) decoding in our procedure,
because the MAP decoding minimizes the decoding error
probability, and the MAP decoding is different from the
ML decoding for the reverse reconciliation. In the ML
decoding for the reverse reconciliation, Alice selects yˆ ∈
F
n
2 such that M yˆ equals the syndrome t = My, and
that the likelihood Pn
X|Y (x|yˆ) is maximized. Since the
prior probability of Bob’s sequence y is not necessarily
the uniform distribution, the ML decoding and the MAP
decoding are not necessarily equivalent, i.e.,
argmax
yˆ:Myˆ=t
PnX|Y (x|yˆ) = argmax
yˆ:Myˆ=t
PnY |X(yˆ|x)
does not hold in general.
Remark 4 By modifying our proposed procedure as fol-
lows, we obtain a procedure in which Alice and Bob can
share a secret key from Alice’s sequence x that is trans-
mitted by z-basis and corresponding Bob’s sequence y
that is received by σx-measurement. Since (x,y) are in-
dependently identically distributed according to
PXY ′(x, y) :=
1
2
〈yx|EB(|xz〉〈xz|)|yx〉, (7)
we replace Pn
X|Y in Step (ii) with P
n
X|Y ′ . By a similar
arguments as in the original procedure, the secure key
rate of the modified procedure is given by
Hρ(X |E)−H(X |Y ′). (8)
In Section IVB, we shall show an example in which
Alice and Bob can share secret keys both from matched
measurement outcomes and mismatched measurement
outcomes, i.e., both Eqs. (4) and (8) are positive.
Remark 5 The sum product algorithm can be used in
Step (ii) of our proposed procedure as follows. For a
given sequence y ∈ Fn2 , and a syndrome t ∈ Fm2 , define a
function
P ∗(xˆ) :=
n∏
j=1
PX|Y (xˆj |yj)
m∏
k=1
1

 ∑
ℓ∈N(k)
xˆℓ = tk

 , (9)
where N(k) := {j |Mkj = 1} for the parity check matrix
M , and 1[·] is the indicator function. The function P ∗(xˆ)
is the non-normalized a posteriori probability distribu-
tion on Fn2 given y and t. The sum-product algorithm
is a method to (approximately) calculate the marginal a
posteriori probability, i.e.,
P ∗j (xˆj) :=
∑
xˆℓ,ℓ 6=j
P ∗(xˆ).
The definition of a posteriori probability in Eq. (9) is
the only difference between the decoding for the Slepian-
Wolf source coding and that for the channel coding. More
5precisely, we replace [35, Eq. (47.6)] with Eq. (9), and use
the algorithm in [35, Section 47.3]. The above procedure
is a generalization of [36], and a special case of [37].
In QKD protocols we should minimize the block error
probability rather than the bit error probability, because
a bit error might propagate to other bits after the privacy
amplification. Although the sum-product algorithm is
designed to minimize the bit error probability, it is known
by computer simulations that the algorithm makes the
block error probability small [35].
III. PROCEDURE FOR CHANNEL
ESTIMATION
In this section we show procedures to estimate Eve’s
ambiguity Hρ(X |E) for the six-state protocol and the
BB84 protocol. We first present general preliminaries
in Section IIIA. Then we show procedures for the six-
state protocol and the BB84 protocol in Sections III B
and III C respectively. In Section III D, we clarify the
relation between our proposed procedures for estimating
Hρ(X |E) and the conventional ones.
Although we explain the procedures to estimate
Hρ(X |E) for the direct reconciliation, the estimation of
Hρ(Y |E) for the reverse reconciliation can be done in a
similar manner.
A. Preliminaries
In the Stokes parameterization, the qubit channel EB
can be described by the affine map parameterized by 12
real parameters [38, 39]:
 θzθx
θy

 7→

 Rzz Rzx RzyRxz Rxx Rxy
Ryz Ryx Ryy



 θzθx
θy

+

 tztx
ty

 , (10)
where (θz, θx, θy) describes a vector in the Bloch sphere
[6]. For the channel EB and each pair of bases (a, b) ∈
{z, x, y}2, define the biases of the outputs as
Qab0 := 〈0b|EB(|0a〉〈0a|)|0b〉 − 〈1b|EB(|0a〉〈0a|)|1b〉,
Qab1 := 〈1b|EB(|1a〉〈1a|)|1b〉 − 〈0b|EB(|1a〉〈1a|)|0b〉.
Then, a straight forward calculation shows the relations
Rba =
1
2
(Qab0 +Qab1), tb =
1
2
(Qab0 −Qab1). (11)
The qubit channel EB can be also described by the
Choi matrix ρAB := (id⊗ EB)(ψ) [40] for the maximally
entangled state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉). By using the
parameters in Eq. (10), we can write the Choi matrix
ρAB as
1
4


1 +Rzz + tz Rxz + tx + iRyz + ity Rzx − iRzy Rxx +Ryy + iRyx − iRxy
Rxz + tx − iRyz − ity 1−Rzz − tz Rxx −Ryy − iRyx − iRxy −Rzx + iRzy
Rzx + iRzy Rxx −Ryy + iRyx + iRxy 1−Rzz + tz −Rxy + tx − iRyz + ity
Rxx +Ryy − iRyx + iRxy −Rzx − iRzy −Rxz + tx + iRyz − ity 1 +Rzz − tz

 , (12)
where i is the imaginary unit.
B. Six-state protocol
An ad-hoc approach to estimate Eve’s ambiguity in the
six-state protocol is very simple, because all parameters
can be estimated from the statistics of sampled bits [7, 8].
(i) By using the statistics of sampled bits and the re-
lation in Eq. (11), Alice and Bob calculate the esti-
mate (R˜, t˜) for the parameters of the channel EB.
(ii) By using Eq. (12), Alice and Bob calculate the cor-
responding matrix ρ˜AB. If the resulting matrix
ρ˜AB is not a Choi matrix, Alice and Bob select a
Choi matrix ρˆAB such that the Frobenius norm be-
tween ρˆAB and ρ˜AB is minimized
7.
(iii) Alice and Bob calculate an estimator Hρˆ(X |E) for
Eve’s ambiguity Hρ(X |E).
The validity of this estimation procedure is shown as
follows. Since the estimators in Step (i) converge to the
true parameters in probability as the number of sampled
bits goes to the infinity, the matrix ρ˜AB also converges
8
to ρAB. Then the Choi matrix ρˆAB also converges to the
7 This step can be implemented, for example, by the convex op-
timization [41] because the set of all Choi matrices is a closed
convex set. For more detail, see Appendix E.
8 When we consider a convergence of a density matrix, the conver-
gence is with respect to the trace distance. On the other-hand,
when we consider a convergence of parameters, we use the Eu-
clidean distance. If estimated parameters converges to the true
values, then the resulting matrix also converges to the true one,
because the convergence of the Frobenius norm and that of the
trace norm are equivalent.
6ρAB. Since the conditional entropy is a continuous func-
tion, the estimator Hρˆ(X |E) in Step (iii) also converges
to Hρ(X |E) in probability as the number of sampled bits
goes to the infinity.
C. BB84 protocol
The estimation of Hρ(X |E) in the BB84 protocol
is much more complicated. When Alice and Bob
only use z-basis and x-basis, the statistics of the in-
put and the output are irrelevant to the parameters
(Rzy, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx, Ryy, ty). Thus, we can only estimate
the parameters ω = (Rzz, Rzx, Rxz, Rxx, tz, tx), and we
have to consider the worst case for the parameters ω,
i.e.,
F (ω) := min
τ∈P′(ω)
Hρτ (X |E), (13)
where P ′(ω) is the set of all parameters τ =
(Rzy, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx, Ryy, ty) such that the parameters ω
and τ constitute a qubit channel, and ρτ is the Choi
matrix corresponding to the parameter τ9.
By using the following proposition, which is proved in
Appendix B, we can make the desired function F (ω) into
a simpler form.
Proposition 1 The minimization in Eq. (13) is achieved
when the parameters, Rzy, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx, and ty, are 0.
The number of free parameters has been reduced to 1 by
Proposition 1. Thus the problem is rewritten as looking
for an estimator of
F (ω) = min
Ryy∈P(ω)
HρRyy (X |E), (14)
where P(ω) is the set of parameters Ryy such that the pa-
rameters ω andRyy constitute a qubit channel when other
parameters are all 0, and ρRyy is the Choi matrix corre-
sponding to the parameter Ryy. Since the range P(ω)
of the remaining free parameter Ryy is a closed interval
and Hρ(X |E) is a convex function (see Lemma 2), the
minimization in F (ω) is achieved at the boundary point
of the range of Ryy or at the zero point of the derivative
of Hρ(X |E) with respect to Ryy.
An ad-hoc approach to find an estimator is as follows.
(i) By using the statistics of sampled bits and the re-
lation in Eq. (11), Alice and Bob calculate the es-
timate ω˜ for the parameters ω.
9 It should be noted that there are some other papers [42, 43,
44] that consider the situation in which we have to estimate a
channel from partially estimated parameters as above. However,
the methods in these papers cannot be used in our problem.
(ii) If P(ω˜) is the empty set, then Alice and Bob find
the point ωˆ such that ωˆ is closest (in Euclidean
distance) to ω˜ and P(ωˆ) is not an empty set10.
(iii) Alice and Bob calculate an estimator F (ωˆ) for Eve’s
(worst-case) ambiguity F (ω).
The validity of this estimation procedure can be shown as
follows. The estimator ω˜ converges to the true value ω in
probability. The estimator ωˆ also converges to ω, because
‖ωˆ− ω˜‖ ≤ ‖ω˜−ω‖, which implies ‖ωˆ−ω‖ ≤ 2‖ω˜−ω‖ by
the triangle inequality. Thus the following lemma, which
is proved in Appendix C, guarantees that the estimator
F (ωˆ) converges to the desired quantity F (ω) in proba-
bility as the number of sampled bits goes to the infinity.
Lemma 1 The function F (ω) is a continuous function
of ω.
Although we showed a procedure to exactly estimate
Eve’s worst case ambiguity so far, it is worthwhile to show
a closed form lower bound on Eve’s worst case ambiguity,
which will be proved in Appendix D.
Proposition 2 Let dz and dx be the singular values of
the matrix [
Rzz Rzx
Rxz Rxx
]
. (15)
Then, we have
F (ω) ≥ 1− h
(
1 + dz
2
)
− h
(
1 + dx
2
)
+ h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz
2
)
, (16)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function. The equality
holds if tz = tx = 0.
Remark 6 For the reverse reconciliation, the worst case
of Eve’s ambiguity Hρ(Y |E) is lower bounded by the
right hand side of Eq. (16) in which Rxz is replaced by
Rzx.
Remark 7 The right hand side of Eq. (16) is further
lower bounded by 1− h((1 −Rxx)/2). Since (1 − Rxx)/2
equals to the so-called phase error rate Px (see Eq. (17)),
the right hand side of Eq. (16) is a lower bound on Eve’s
worst case ambiguity that is tighter than the well known
bound 1− h(Px) [14].
10 This step can be implemented, for example, by the convex op-
timization [41] because the set of all ωˆs such that P(ωˆ) is not
empty is a closed convex set. For more detail, see Appendix E.
7Remark 8 We described estimation methods for Eve’s
ambiguity Hρ(X |E) based on the channel estimation
method so-called linear inversion [45] in Section III B and
in this section. It is well-known that the maximum likeli-
hood (ML) channel estimator has smaller estimation er-
ror than the linear inversion [45]. An algorithm for ML
channel estimation has been proposed [45, 46, 47], how-
ever, its convergence as a numerical algorithm has not
been proved. The absence of a convergence proof pre-
vents us from using that algorithm in the QKD protocols
that require a rigorous proof of the convergence of an
estimator.
The computation of the ML channel estimate in the
six-state protocol is a convex optimization problem. Be-
cause the set of Choi matrices is a closed convex set de-
fined by equality constraints and generalized inequality
constraints [41] and the log-likelihood function is a con-
cave function of Choi matrices for given measurement
outcomes. Therefore, the interior point method [41], for
example, can compute the ML estimate with convergence
guarantee. For the BB84 protocol, the domain of log-
likelihood function is narrowed to real Choi matrices by
Proposition 1 that is also a closed convex set, and the pa-
rameter Ryy remains undetermined as well as the linear
inversion because the log-likelihood function is indepen-
dent of Ryy. The rest of parameters can be computed
by a convex optimization algorithm. If we are allowed to
use enough computation time for sophisticated channel
estimation procedures, then it may be better to use the
ML channel estimation.
D. Relation to the conventional estimation
procedure
In this section, we show the relation between Eve’s
ambiguity Hρ(X |E) that is estimated by our proposed
procedures and that estimated by the conventional pro-
cedures.
In the conventional procedure to estimate Hρ(X |E) in
the six-state protocol [14], we first estimate the so called
the error rate for each basis:
Pz :=
〈1z|EB(|0z〉〈0z|)|1z〉+ 〈0z|EB(|1z〉〈1z|)|0z〉
2
,
Px :=
〈1x|EB(|0x〉〈0x|)|1x〉+ 〈0x|EB(|1x〉〈1x|)|0x〉
2
,(17)
Py :=
〈1y|EB(|0y〉〈0y|)|1y〉+ 〈0y|EB(|1y〉〈1y|)|0y〉
2
.
Then, we calculate the worst case of Eve’s ambiguity
minHρ(X |E) in which the minimization is taken over
the set of all channels that are compatible with the es-
timates of the error rates (Pz, Px, Py). Since we estimate
the actual channel instead of the worst case, Eve’s ambi-
guity estimated by our procedure is at least as large as
that estimated by the conventional one.
In the conventional procedure to estimate Hρ(X |E) in
the BB84 protocol, we first estimate Pz and Px. Then we
calculate the worst case of Eve’s ambiguity minHρ(X |E)
in which the minimization is taken over the set of all
channels that are compatible with the estimates of the
error rates (Pz, Px). The minimum is given by the well
known value 1−h(Px) [14]. Since the error rates (Pz, Px)
are degraded version of the parameters ω, the range of
minimization in the conventional procedure is larger than
P(ω) in our proposed procedure. Thus, Eve’s worst case
ambiguity estimated by our proposed procedure is at
least as large as that estimated by the conventional one.
For both the six-state protocol and the BB84 proto-
col, a sufficient condition such that Eve’s worst case am-
biguity estimated by our proposed procedure and that
estimated by the conventional one coincide is that the
channel EB is a Pauli channel. However, it is not clear
whether the condition is also a necessary condition or
not.
Combining the arguments in this section and Remark
1, we find that our proposed classical processing yields
at least as high key rate as the standard processing by
Shor and Preskill [18] for the QKD protocols.
IV. EXAMPLES
In this section, we calculate the key rates of the BB84
protocol and the six-state protocol with our proposed
classical processing for the amplitude damping channel,
the unital channel, and the rotation channel, and clarify
that the key rate of our proposed classical processing is
higher than previously known ones.
A. Amplitude damping channel
In the Stokes parameterization, the amplitude damp-
ing channel Ep is given by the afine map
 θzθx
θy

 7→

 1− p 0 00 √1− p 0
0 0
√
1− p



 θzθx
θy

+

 p0
0

(18)
parameterized by a real parameter 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
We first calculate the key rate for the BB84 protocol.
In the BB84 protocol, we can estimate the parameters
Rzz = 1 − p, Rzx = 0, Rxz = 0, Rxx =
√
1− p, tz = p,
tx = 0. By the proposition 1, we can set Rzy = Rxy =
Ryz = Ryx = ty = 0. Furthermore, by the condition on
the TPCP map [39]
(Rxx −Ryy)2 ≤ (1−Rzz)2 − t2z ,
we can decide the remaining parameter as Ryy =
√
1− p.
Thus, Eve’s (worst-case) ambiguity F (ω) for the BB84
protocol coincide with the true value Hρ(X |E), which
means that the BB84 protocol can achieve the same key
rate as the six-state protocol.
80.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Direct
Reverse
Conventional six-state
Conventional BB84
p
K
ey
 r
at
e
FIG. 1: (Color online) Comparison of the key rates against
the parameter p of the amplitude damping channel (see
Eq. (18)). “Reverse” and “Direct” are the key rates when we
use the reverse reconciliation and the direct reconciliation in
our proposed classical processing respectively. “Conventional
six-state” and “Conventional BB84” are the key rates of the
six-state protocol and the BB84 protocol with the conven-
tional classical processing. Note that the conventional classi-
cal processing involves the noisy preprocessing [14, 16].
By straightforward calculations, the key rates of the
direct reconciliation and reverse reconciliation are calcu-
lated as
1 +
1
2
h(p)− h
(p
2
)
− 1 + p
2
h
(
1
1 + p
)
,
and
h
(
1 + p
2
)
+
1 + p
2
h
(
1
1 + p
)
− h
(
1
2
)
− 1
2
h(p)
respectively. These key rates are plotted in Fig. 1.
The Bell diagonal entries of the Choi matrix (id ⊗
Ep)(ψ) are 14 (2 + 2
√
1− p − p), 14p, 14 (2 − 2
√
1− p − p),
and 14p. The key rate of the six-state protocol and the
BB84 protocol with the conventional processing can be
calculated only from the Bell diagonal entries, and are
also plotted in Fig. 1.
We find that the key rates of our proposed classical
processing are higher than those of the conventional pro-
cessing. Furthermore, we find that the key rate of the
reverse reconciliation is higher than that of the direct
reconciliation.
Remark 9 When the channel is degradable [48], i.e.,
there exists a channel D such that EE(ρ) = D ◦ EB(ρ)
for any input ρ, the quantum wiretap channel capacity
[49] is known to be achievable without any auxiliary ran-
dom variable [50].
For the one-way key agreement from a degradable
(from Alice to Bob and Eve) {ccq}-state, which is a state
ρXYE =
∑
x,y PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρx,yE such that
there exist states {ρˆyE}y satisfying
∑
y PY |X(y|x)ρˆyE =
ρxE :=
∑
y PY |X(y|x)ρx,yE , a similar statement also holds,
namely the key rate in Eq. (4) cannot be improved with
any auxiliary random variable. The use of auxiliary ran-
dom variable for the key agreement corresponds to the
noisy preprocessing [14, 16].
The above statement is proved as follows. Since we
are considering the information reconciliation and the
privacy amplification with one-way classical communi-
cation, key rates only depend on distribution PXY and
{cq}-state ρXE . Thus the maximum key rate for ρXYE
is equals to that for degraded version of it, ρˆXYE :=∑
x,y PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρˆyE . On the other hand
the (quantum) intrinsic information
Iρ(X ;Y ↓ E) := inf Iρ(X ;Y |E′)
is an upper bound on the maximum key rate [51], where
Iρ(X ;Y |E′) := Hρ(XE)+Hρ(Y E)−Hρ(XYE)−Hρ(E)
is the quantum conditional mutual information, and the
infimum is taken over all {ccq}-states ρXY E′ = (id ⊗
NE→E′)(ρXYE) for CPTP maps NE→E′ from system E
to E′. Taking the identity map idE , the quantum condi-
tional mutual information Iρ(X ;Y |E) itself is an upper
bound on the maximum key rate. Applying this fact for
the degraded {ccq}-state, ρˆXYE , the maximum key rate
is upper bounded by
Iρˆ(X ;Y |E)
= Iρˆ(X ;Y E)− Iρˆ(X ;E)
= Hρˆ(X |E)−H(X |Y ) + Iρˆ(X ;E|Y )
= Hρ(X |E)−H(X |Y ),
which is the desired upper bound, and is equal to Eq. (4).
When Alice randomly sends {|0z〉, |1z〉} over the am-
plitude damping channel and Bob measures the re-
ceived state by σz observable, the resulting {ccq}-state is
degradable11, which implies the key rate of direct recon-
ciliation cannot be improved by the noisy preprocessing.
It is not clear whether the {ccq}-state for the amplitude
damping channel is degradable in reverse order; there
exists a possibility to improve the key rate of reverse rec-
onciliation by the noisy preprocessing.
B. Unital channel and rotation channel
A channel EB is called a unital channel if the vector
(tz, tx, ty) is the zero vector in the Stokes parameteriza-
tion (see Eq. (10)), or equivalently if the channel EB maps
the completely mixed state I/2 to itself. The unital chan-
nel has the following physical meaning in QKD protocols.
When Eve conducts the Pauli cloning [53] with respect
to an orthonormal basis that is a rotated version of {|0z〉,
11 The fact that amplitude damping channel is degradable has been
shown in [52].
9|1z〉}, the quantum channel from Alice to Bob is not a
Pauli channel but a unital channel. It is natural to as-
sume that Eve cannot determine the direction of the ba-
sis {|0z〉, |1z〉} accurately, and the unital channel deserve
consideration in the QKD research as well as the Pauli
channel.
By the singular value decomposition, we can decom-
pose the matrix R in Eq. (10) as
O2

 ez 0 00 ex 0
0 0 ey

O1, (19)
where O1 and O2 are some rotation matrices
12, and |ez|,
|ex|, and |ey| are the singular value of the matrix R13.
Thus, we can consider the unital channel EB as the com-
position of the unitary channel EO1 , the Pauli channel
̺ 7→ qi̺+ qzσz̺σz + qxσx̺σx + qyσy̺σy,
and the unitary channel EO2 , where
qi =
1 + ez + ex + ey
4
,
qz =
1 + ez − ex − ey
4
,
qx =
1− ez + ex − ey
4
,
qy =
1− ez − ex + ey
4
[54].
For the unital channel, we have H(X |Y ) = H(Y |X) =
h((1 +Rzz)/2). For the six-state protocol, we can calcu-
late Eve’s ambiguity Hρ(X |E) as
1−H [qi, qz, qx, qy] + h

1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz +R
2
yz
2

 (20)
because (qi, qz, qx, qy) are the eigenvalues of the Choi ma-
trix ρAB. For the reverse reconciliation, Eve’s ambi-
guity Hρ(Y |E) is given by Eq. (20) in which Rxz and
Ryz are replaced by Rzx and Rzy respectively. Thus,
R2xz + R
2
yz = R
2
zx + R
2
zy is the necessary and sufficient
condition for Hρ(X |E) = Hρ(Y |E). For the BB84
protocol, we can calculate Eve’s worst case ambiguity
F (ω) by Proposition 2 because tz = tx = 0 for the
unital channel. Note that the singular values (dz, dx)
in Proposition 2 are different from the singular values
12 The rotation matrix is the real orthogonal matrix with determi-
nant 1.
13 The decomposition is not unique because we can change the or-
der of (ez, ex, ey) or the sign of them by adjusting the rotation
matrices O1 and O2. However, the result in this paper does not
depends on a choice of the decomposition.
(|ez|, |ex|) in general because there exist off-diagonal ele-
ments (Rzy, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx). From Remark 6, R
2
xz = R
2
zx is
the necessary and sufficient condition for that Eve’s worst
case ambiguity for the direct reconciliation and that for
the reverse reconciliation coincide.
In the rest of this section, we analyze a special class of
the unital channel, the rotation channel. We define the
rotation channel from Alice to Bob as
 θzθx
θy

 7→

 cosϑ − sinϑ 0sinϑ cosϑ 0
0 0 1



 θzθx
θy

 .
The rotation channels occur, for example, when the direc-
tions of the transmitter and the receiver are not properly
aligned.
For the rotation channel, Eq. (16) gives F (ω) = 1,
which implies that Eve gained no information. Thus,
Eve’s (worst-case) ambiguity for the BB84 protocol co-
incide with the true value Hρ(X |E), and the BB84 pro-
tocol with our proposed classical processing can achieve
the same key rate as the six-state protocol.
There are two reasons why we show this example—the
rotation channel. The first one is that we can obtain se-
cret keys, in the BB84 protocol, both from matched mea-
surement outcomes, which are transmitted and received
by the same basis (say z-basis), and mismatched measure-
ment outcomes, which are transmitted and received by
different bases (say z-basis and x-basis respectively). The
probability distributions of Alice and Bob’s bit for each
case are given by PX|Y (1|0) = PX|Y (0|1) = sin2(ϑ/2)
and PX|Y ′(1|0) = PX|Y ′(0|1) = sin2(ϑ/2 − π/4) respec-
tively (see Eqs. (1) and (7) for the definitions of PXY and
PXY ′). If the channel is biased, i.e., ϑ 6= 0, π/2, π, 3π/2,
then we can obtain secret keys with positive key rates
both from matched measurement outcomes and mis-
matched measurement outcomes. This fact solves an
open problem discussed in [22, Section 5].
The second reason is that we can obtain a secret key
from matched measurement outcomes even though the
so called error rate is higher than the 25% limit [23] in
the BB84 protocol. The Bell diagonal entries of the Choi
matrix ρϑ are cos
2(ϑ/2), 0, 0, and sin2(ϑ/2). Thus the
error rate is sin2(ϑ/2). For π/3 ≤ ϑ ≤ 5π/3, the error
rate is higher than 25%, but we can obtain the positive
key rate, 1 − h(sin2(ϑ/2)) except ϑ = π/2, 3π/2. Note
that the key rate of the standard processing by Shor and
Preskill [18] is 1− 2h(sin2(ϑ/2)). This fact verifies Curty
et al’s suggestion [24] that key agreement might be pos-
sible even for the error rates higher than 25% limits.
Remark 10 If the {ccq}-state ρXY E is degraded (from
Alice to Bob and Eve), i.e., the {ccq}-state is of the form
ρXYE =
∑
x,y PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x|⊗ |y〉〈y|⊗ρyE , then we can
prove that the key rate in Eq. (4) cannot be improved
even if we use any noisy preprocessing or two-way pro-
cessing. The reason is that the upper bound Iρ(X ;Y |E)
and the lower bound in Eq. (4) coincide for the degraded
{ccq}-state in a similar manner to Remark 9.
10
For the rotation channel Eϑ, the resulting {ccq}-state
is obviously degraded. Thus the key rate 1−h(sin2(ϑ/2))
cannot be improved any more.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we constructed a practically imple-
mentable classical processing for the BB84 protocol and
the six-state protocol that fully utilizes the accurate
channel estimation method. A consequence of our result
is that we should not discard mismatched measurement
outcomes in the QKD protocols; those measurement out-
comes can be used to estimate the channel accurately,
and increase key rates.
There is a problem that was not treated in this paper.
Although we only treated asymptotically secure key rate
in this paper, the final goal is the non-asymptotic anal-
ysis of eavesdropper’s information, i.e., evaluate eaves-
dropper’s information as a function of the length of the
raw key, the key rate, and the length of sample bits as in
literatures [15, 34, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60]. This topic is a
future research agenda.
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APPENDIX A: CONVEXITY OF EVE’S
AMBIGUITY
In this appendix, we show a lemma that will be used
in the rest of the appendices.
Lemma 2 For two channels E1B and E2B, and a proba-
bilistically mixed channel E ′B := λE1B + (1 − λ)E2B , Eve’s
ambiguity is convex, i.e., we have
Hρ′(X |E) ≤ λHρ1(X |E) + (1− λ)Hρ2 (X |E),
where ρ′XE :=
∑
x∈F2
1
2 |x〉〈x| ⊗ E ′E(|x〉〈x|) for chan-
nel E ′E to all the environment of E ′B, and ρrXE :=∑
x∈F2
1
2 |x〉〈x| ⊗ ErE(|x〉〈x|) for channel ErE to all the en-
vironment of ErB and for r ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. For r = 1 and 2, let ψrABE be a purification of
the Choi matrix ρrAB := (id ⊗ ErB)(ψ). Then the density
matrix ρrXE is derived by Alice’s measurement by z-basis
and the partial trace over Bob’s system, i.e.,
ρrXE = TrB
[∑
x
(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)ψrABE(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)
]
. (A1)
Let
|ψ′ABER〉 :=
√
λ|ψ1ABE〉|1〉+
√
1− λ|ψ2ABE〉|2〉
be a purification of ρ′AB := (id⊗E ′B)(ψ), where HR is the
reference system, and {|1〉, |2〉} is an orthonormal basis
of HR. Let
ρ′XER := TrB
[∑
x
(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)ψ′ABER(|x〉〈x| ⊗ I)
]
,(A2)
and let
ρ∗XER :=
∑
r∈{1,2}
(I ⊗ |r〉〈r|)ρ′XER(I ⊗ |r〉〈r|)
= λρ1XE ⊗ |1〉〈1|+ (1− λ)ρ2XE ⊗ |2〉〈2|
be the density matrix such that the system HR is mea-
sured by {|1〉, |2〉} basis. Then we have
Hρ′(X |ER)
= H(X)− Iρ′(X ;ER)
≤ H(X)− Iρ∗(X ;ER)
= Hρ∗(X |ER)
= λHρ1(X |E) + (1 − λ)Hρ2(X |E),
where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of
the quantum mutual information for measurements (data
processing inequality) [61]. By renaming the systems ER
to E, we have the assertion of the lemma. 
Remark 11 By switching the role of Alice and Bob, we
can show that the assertion in Lemma 2 and thus Propo-
sition 1 hold for the reverse reconciliation. Furthermore,
the statements also hold for the information reconcilia-
tion and the privacy amplification with k-block-wise two-
way processing [23, 28] (including one-way noisy prepro-
cessing [14, 16]). More precisely, let NXkY k→UV be the
TPCP map that represents a two-way processing. Then
for the density matrix
ρUV Ek := (NXkY k→UV ⊗ idEk)(ρ⊗kXY E),
11
we can obtain the inequality
Hρ′(U |V Ek) ≤ λHρ1(U |V Ek) + (1− λ)Hρ2 (U |V Ek).
The modifications of the proof is to replace ψrABE and
ψ′ABER with (ψ
r
ABE)
⊗k and (ψ′ABER)
⊗k in Eqs. (A1) and
(A2), to replace the partial trace over Bob’s system with
Bob’s measurement, to append a map NXkY k→UV , and
to replace the measurement on the system HR with the
measurements on H⊗kR .
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The statement of the Proposition 1 easily follows from
Lemma 2. For any channel EB, let E¯B be the channel
whose Choi matrix is the complex conjugate of that for
EB. Note that eigenvalues of density matrices are un-
changed by the complex conjugate, and thus Eve’s ambi-
guity Hρ¯(X |E) for E¯B equals to Hρ(X |E). By applying
Lemma 2 for E1B = EB, E2B = E¯B, and λ = 12 , we have
Hρ′ ≤ 1
2
Hρ(X |E) + 1
2
Hρ¯(X |E),
where ρ′AB =
1
2ρAB +
1
2 ρ¯AB. Note that ρ
′
AB is a real
density matrix whose entries are equal to the real compo-
nents of ρAB, which implies that the parametersRzy, Rxy,
Ryz, Ryx, and ty, are 0 by Eq. (12). Since the channel EB
was arbitrary, we have the assertion of the proposition.

APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since the conditional entropy is a continuous function,
the following statement is suffice for proving that F (ω)
is continuous function at any ω0 ∈ P , where P is the set
of all ω such that P(ω) is not empty. For any ω ∈ P such
that ‖ω − ω0‖ ≤ ε, there exist ε′, ε′′ > 0 such that
P(ω) ⊂ Bε′(P(ω0)), (C1)
P(ω0) ⊂ Bε′′(P(ω)), (C2)
and ε′ and ε′′ converge to 0 as ε goes to 0, where
Bε′(P(ω0)) is the ε′-neighbor of the set P(ω0).
Define the set Q := {(ω,Ryy) | ω ∈ P , Ryy ∈ P(ω)},
which is a closed convex set. Define functions
U(ω) := max
Ryy∈P(ω)
Ryy,
L(ω) := min
Ryy∈P(ω)
Ryy
as the upper surface and the lower surface of the set Q re-
spectively. Then U(ω) and L(ω) are concave and convex
functions respectively, because Q is a convex set. Thus
U(ω) and L(ω) are continuous functions except the ex-
treme points of P . For any extreme point ω′ and for
any interior point ω, we have U(ω) ≥ U(ω′) and L(ω) ≤
L(ω′), because Q is a convex set. Since Q is a closed
set, we have limω→ω′ U(ω) ∈ P(ω′) and limω→ω′ L(ω) ∈
P(ω′), which implies that U(ω′) = limω→ω′ U(ω) and
L(ω′) = limω→ω′ L(ω). Thus U(ω) and L(ω) are also
continuous at the extreme points. Since P(ω) is a con-
vex set, the continuity of U(ω) and L(ω) implies that
Eqs. (C1) and (C2) hold for some ε′, ε′′ > 0, and ε′ and
ε′′ converge to 0 as ε goes to 0. 
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
By Proposition 1, it suffice to consider the channel EB
of the form
 θzθx
θy

 7→

 Rzz Rzx 0Rxz Rxx 0
0 0 Ryy



 θzθx
θy

+

 tztx
0

 .
Define the channel E−B (̺) := σy(EB(σy̺σy))σy and the
mixed channel E ′B := 12EB + 12E−B . Since the channel E−B
is given by
 θzθx
θy

 7→

 Rzz Rzx 0Rxz Rxx 0
0 0 Ryy



 θzθx
θy

+

 −tz−tx
0

 ,
E ′B is a unital channel and the matrix part of EB and E ′B
are the same. Furthermore, since Hρ(X |E) for EB equals
to Hρ−(X |E) for E−B , by using Lemma 2, we have
Hρ(X |E) ≥ Hρ′(X |E).
The rest of the proof is to calculate the minimization
of Hρ′(X |E) with respect to Ryy. By the singular value
decomposition, we can decompose the matrix R′ corre-
sponding to the channel E ′B as
O2

 d˜z 0 00 d˜x 0
0 0 Ryy

O1,
where O1 and O2 are some rotation matrices within z −
x-plane, and |d˜z| and |d˜x| are the singular value of the
matrix in Eq. (15). Then, we have
min
Ryy
Hρ′(X |E)
= min
Ryy
[
1−H(ρ′AB) +
∑
x∈F2
1
2
H(E ′B(|x〉〈x|))
]
= 1−max
Ryy
H [qi, qz, qx, qy] + h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz
2
)
= 1− h(qi + qz)− h(qi + qx) + h
(
1 +
√
R2zz +R
2
xz
2
)
,
where (qi, qz, qx, qy) are the eigenvalues of the Choi matrix
ρ′AB. By noting that qi + qz =
1+d˜z
2 and qi + qx =
1+d˜x
2
(see Section IVB), we have assertion of the proposition.

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APPENDIX E: CONVEX OPTIMIZATION
In this appendix, we briefly explain how to apply a
convex optimization method, the interior-point method,
to the channel estimation in the BB84 protocol. In a
similar manner, we can apply the interior-point method
to the channel estimation in the six-state protocol. For
more detail, see the textbook [41, Section 11.6].
First, we define a generalized inequality. Since the set
K ⊂ R4×4 of (real) semi-definite matrices is a proper cone
(see [41, Section 2.4.1] for the definition of the proper
cone), we can define a generalized inequality K as
M K N ⇐⇒ N −M ∈ K.
For a given parameter (ω,Ryy) ∈ R7, we define the real
matrix ρ(ω,Ryy) ∈ R4×4 by using the relation in Eq. (12),
where we set other parameters (Rzy, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx, ty) to
be all 0. Then, the function ρ : R7 → R4×4 is a K-
concave function (see [41, Section 3.6.2] for the definition
of the K-concave function).
We can formulate our optimization problem as follows:
minimize ‖ωˆ − ω˜‖2
subject to ρ(ωˆ, Ryy) K 0,
TrB[ρ(ωˆ, Ryy)] = I,
where ‖ ·‖2 is the square Euclidean norm, which is a con-
vex function, and I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix. This
optimization problem can be solved by the interior-point
method. Note that we can use log det ρ(ωˆ, Ryy) as a log-
arithmic barrier function (see [41, Example 11.7]).
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